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Structure and Process in 
Cognitive Psychology Using 
Multidimensional Scaling and 
Related Techniques 
Edward J. Shoben 
Brian H. Ross 
University of Illinois 
INTRODUCTION 
The goal of cognitive psychology is to provide a general understanding of human 
cognitive processes through the development of general , formal models of cogni-
tion . Although it is clearl y true that some areas (such as memory) have been 
more highly developed than others, it is undeniable that cognitive psychology 
has witnessed a proliferation of models in the past decade. Perhaps researchers 
are find ing it increasingly difficult to discriminate among competing memory 
models because the constraints are so weak. One possibility that will be explored 
in this chapter is the prospect of using multidimensional scaling (MDS) and 
related procedures as a means of providing constraint for theorizing . 
In this chapter, we initially provide a brief description of the problem of the 
inability to distinguish among models . Subsequently, we sketch some scaling 
and clustering procedures. We then discuss a number of applications of MDS and 
related procedures to domains of interest to cognitive psychologists . Particular 
attention is given to the constraint provided by these techniques on cognitive 
theorizing. Subsequently , we outline how one might choose the correct pro-
cedure and how one might circumvent some problems raised by using these 
procedures to study cognitive domains . Next , we provide a brief application of 
these procedures to the domain of cognitive psychology models . Finally, we 
attempt to provide an assessment of the utility of MDS and related procedures in 
cognitive psychology. 
229 
From THE INFLUENCE OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY ON TESTING, edited by  
Royce R. Ronning, John A. Glover, Jane C. Conoley, and Joseph C. Witt (Hillsdale, 
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1987). Copyright © 1987 Lawrence Erlbaum  
Associates, Inc. Digital Edition Copyright © 2012 Buros Center for Testing.
230 SHOBEN AND ROSS 
DISTINGUISHING THEORIES: AN ILLUSTRATIVE 
EXAMPLE 
One particularly salient example of the difficulty in telling seemingly contradic-
tory theories apart is the recent dispute over the viability of the semantic/episodic 
distinction in human memory. Briefly, Tulving (1983) has proposed that the 
human memory system can profitably be divided into memory for general world 
knowledge (semantic) and memory for personal events (episodic). In contrast, 
other theorists have claimed that a unitary theory of memory provides a better 
account (Anderson & Ross, 1980; McKoon, Ratcliff, & Dell, in press). 
It would certainly seem that two theoretical viewpoints that differ in the 
desirability of partitioning the memory system along such fundamental lines 
should be easy to tell apart. In fact, this goal has proven elusive. To date, the 
most conclusive kind of evidence on this issue is the dissociation experiment in 
which one examines the effects of an independent variable on an episodic memo-
ry task and a semantic one. If we find that the variable has different effects on the 
two tasks, then according to Tulving (1983) we have evidence for the distinction. 
Although one might reasonably believe that these dissociation experiments 
might resolve this issue, they have not. Proponents of a unitary view argue that 
when the task changes it is often necessary for the cognitive operations to change 
also and consequently we should expect these kinds of dissociations. More 
explicitly, the confusion over the semantic/episodic distinction can best be un-
derstood in terms of the distinction between structure and process in cognitive 
psychology. Basically, any model must specify a set of structural assumptions 
and a set of processing assumptions. The problem is that whereas one set of 
assumptions might nicely account for some set of data, it is also the case that a 
very different set of structural assumptions, usually accompanied by a very 
different set of processing assumptions, can also account for the same set of data. 
Compounding the problem is that many models are not sufficiently detailed as to 
have both an explicit set of structural assumptions and an explicit set of process-
ing assumptions. 
In the case of the semantic/episodic distinction, both problems are operative. 
Proponents of the distinction explain the dissociation by appealing to the differ-
ent memory structures involved. Unitary theorists claim that different tasks will 
necessarily involve some different processes and therefore dissociations are far 
from unequivocal evidence for a structural distinction. Without explicit process-
ing assumptions, it is impossible to determine who has the stronger claim. 
One obvious solution to this problem is to require our theorizing to be more 
precise. McKoon, Ratcliff, and Dell (in press) have made this suggestion quite 
eloquently and have also proposed a somewhat more detailed version of the 
unitary theory. However, it would be naive of us to suppose that precision in 
theorizing will naturally occur because vagueness leads to problems in telling 
theories apart. What is needed are techniques that enable us to develop more 
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detailed theories. One possibility is any technique that provides some constraint 
on structure. Although it is not immediately obvious to us that multidimensional 
scaling will help with making these accounts of the semantic/episodic distinction 
more distinguishable , we do believe that multidimensional scaling and kindred 
procedures may, in general, provide this very necessary kind of constraint. 
One typically uses MDS to obtain a structural representation of a stimulus 
domain. It will not provide a process model, although the structure recovered 
may suggest one. One way to examine the claim that MDS will provide con-
straint to cognitive theories is to examine some previous uses of the method to 
determine if its use has provided any constraint on theorizing in the area of 
application. 
KINDS OF MDS AND RELATED PROCEDURES 
Before examining the applications of MDS in cognitive psychology, it is useful 
to make some preliminary distinctions among procedures that correspond to 
conceptual differences among applications. The most important differences are 
whether the recovered representation is continuous or discrete and whether indi-
vidual differences are taken into account. 
Carroll and Arabie (1980), in their review of multidimensional scaling pro-
pose a detailed taxonomy of MDS methods, of which only a portion will be used 
here. Two-way MDS is the oldest of these procedures. Originally developed by 
Shepard (l962a, 1962b) and Kruskal (l964a, 1964b), the original program has 
evolved considerably over the last 2 decades. In the most modern version, 
KYST, the input data are a matrix of proximities in which the rows and columns 
of the matrix represent stimulus objects. KYST uses this type of input matrix that 
contains the similarity (or dissimilarity) of each object to each other object. The 
output of the procedure is a graphical depiction of the stimulus objects in k 
dimensions. In contrast to this continuous measure , there are also discrete two-
way procedures. One of the most promising is MAPCLUS, the Arabie and 
Carroll (1980) algorithm for fitting the Shepard-Arabie ADCLUS (1979) model. 
This procedure takes the same input data as KYST and returns a solution of k 
clusters of stimulus objects with a cluster weight (and an additive constant). 
Goodness-of-fit is measured somewhat differently in the two procedures: 
MAPCLUS provides variance accounted for whereas KYST reports STRESS, a 
badness-of-fit measure. 
A similar classification can be made of three-way procedures , which take 
individual differences I into account. These procedures all take an input matrix 
IStrictly speaking, the third " way " need not be variation among individuals; it may instead be 
differences in groups of people or stimulus context, but the most common use is individuals. We 
employ the most common use here because it is easier to understand . 
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whose rows and columns represent stimulus objects, as in the two-way matrix , 
but whose extra third dimension represents individuals. Conceptually , one can 
think of this matrix as a series of two-way matrices where each individual 
contributes one two-way matrix. The most common three-way analogue to 
KYST is INDSCAL, developed by Carroll and Chang (1970), or its faster-
running successor SINDSCAL (Pruzansky, 1975). Like KYST, INDSCAL out-
puts a spatial representation of the stimulus objects in k dimensions. However, in 
addition to this object space , INDSCAL also provides a subject space, a plot of 
the weight that each subject assigns to each dimension. 
For discrete models, Arabie and Carroll (1983) have developed an individual 
differences variant of MAPCLUS named INDCLUS. This procedure takes a 
three-way matrix of proximities (exactly as in SINDSCAL) and outputs k clus-
ters where each cluster contains elements of the stimulus domain, but INDCLUS 
also provides a cluster weighting for each individual subject. Thus, just as 
INDSCAL provided a weighting for each subject on each dimension, so too 
INDCLUS provides a weighting for each subject on each cluster. 
Generally speaking, researchers have employed two-way models when they 
sought to describe a stimulus structure that was assumed to be common to all 
individuals and a three-way method when the underlying representation was 
assumed to vary across individuals. There have been two types of exceptions to 
this rule. First, because three-way methods can often extract higher dimension-
ality , some investigators have employed these methods even when variation over 
individuals was not an issue. Second, there have been several creative uses of 
three-way methods in which the third way was not individuals , but some other 
factor, such as age of the particular group of subjects (in developmental studies) 
or context. Third, three-way methods yield unique orientation of axes, while the 
axes provided by the two-way methods are usually arbitrary, and so are subject to 
rotation. 
MDS AS A METHOD FOR DETERMINING STRUCTURE 
Much of the early work in cognitive psychology that used MDS did so ex-
clusively for descriptive purposes. For example, in one of the largest collections 
of scaling work,Fillenbaum and Rappaport (1971) used a precursor of KYST to 
scale a large number of semantic terms ranging from verbs to classes of nouns. 
Similarly , Clark (1968) scaled a large number of common prepositions. After 
presenting the graphic solution , the main problem remaining was to label the 
dimensions . Although we discuss some solutions to this problem below, the 
standard of 15 years ago was simply to examine the dimensions and label them 
intuitively . Even under these relat ively relaxed standards, it is clear that some of 
this research was quite fruitful. 
One of the most widely analyzed data sets is the confusion matrices collected 
by Miller and Nicely (1955) on consonant phonemes. Shepard (1972) incorporat-
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ed the idea of fitting an exponential decay function on the original confusion 
proportions before performing the MDS analysis. He recovered a two-dimen-
sional solution in which the first dimension distinguished voiced phonemes (za 
and da) from unvoiced ones (fa and ka). The second dimension separated the 
nasals (ma and na) from the other consonant phonemes. Within these remaining 
phonemes, there was also a separation between those that are formed at the front 
of the mouth (fa and ba) and those that are formed at the rear (ga and zha). These 
results thus gave considerable support to the featural interpretation of consonant 
phonemes. 
The color domain has also been of long-standing interest to users of MDS 
(Ekman, 1954). In fact, color was the primary example that Shepard used in his 
original paper (1962a). Using the judged similarity of the common color names, 
Shepard found that the data were well fit by a two-dimensional solution in which 
the names were arranged in a color circle in which there was a gap between the 
color with shortest wavelength (violet) and the one with the longest wavelength 
(red). In the circle, the points are arranged in terms of their wavelength, such that 
connecting the points in the circle orders the colors monotonically in terms of 
their wavelength. In addition, the fact that red and violet are quite close to each 
other (even though they are maximally different in wavelength) accords quite 
well with our intuition that these colors are psychologically quite similar. 
Semantic. In contrast to the perceptual and sensory domains, the results of 
using MDS with semantic domains are generally less clear-cut. There are several 
possible reasons why the results of MDS analysis are not always salutary with 
this kind of domain. First, it is the case that most semantic domains are of 
functionally infinite size (although there are exceptions to this general principle, 
such as kin terms and Engli sh prepositions). Thus, some selection of exemplars 
from a domain must be made, and, somewhat surprisingly , this selection is often 
done haphazardly. Different subsets will yield different results . Second, the 
meaning of various terms can change with the context. This change can be either 
a function of homonyms or some more subtle change. For a subtle change, the 
meaning of eagle may be different in the context of other birds than is its 
meaning in the context of other predators. For a radical change the location of bat 
in a multidimensional space is going to be different if bat is among other rodents 
or among other types of sporting equipment. We discuss context effects in 
greater detail in a later section. Third , semantic domains are potentiall y more 
heterogeneous than other domains we have considered. Thus, while all color 
names can be compared on hue, brightness, and saturation, it is difficult to 
imagine even a single dimension on which one could relate drunkenness, lion, 
and chair. Fourth, some semantic domains, such as categories, that are fre-
quently subjected to MDS analysis may pose technical problems for many of the 
MDS programs that are presently used. We discuss this issue in a later section . 
One of the most commonly scaled semantic domains is categories and one of 
the most commonly scaled categories is animals. Beginning with Henley (1969), 
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there have been a number of MDS analyses of this particular domain. Henley 
presented a three-dimensional solution in which the first dimension ordered the 
animals along the continuum of size. The second dimension, which Henley 
(1969) labeled ferocity had predators at one pole and domesticated animals at the 
other. The third dimension was largely uninterpretable. It did seem to set off the 
anthropoid apes from the other animals, and perhaps for this reason, Henley 
elected to label it as humanness. However, relatively intelligent animals like the 
elephant ranked near the bottom of this dimension, and it thus seems that a just 
conclusion is that this third dimension is uninterpretable. 
There has been minor controversy over how many dimensions are appropriate 
for this domain. Using INDSCAL, Rips, Shoben, and Smith (1973) obtained a 
satisfactory fit to their data in two dimensions, which they labeled size and 
predacity. Their second dimension was much like Henley's in that it separated 
the predators from the farm animals; they felt that ferocity was misleading and 
therefore employed the obscure term predacity. In addition to the satisfactory fit 
that Rips et al. (1973) obtained, they also were able to use the distances obtained 
from the solution to predict categorization latencies. Generally speaking, exem-
plars that were further in the space from the category label took longer to 
categorize. Shoben (1976) also found that mammals could be fit in these same 
two dimensions, although he used only 6 mammal exemplars and 6 bird exem-
plars. Many other researchers have been unable to obtain an adequate fit without 
going to a largely uninterpretable third dimension. For example, King , Gruene-
wald, and Lockhead (1978) argued for a three-dimensional solution, and 
Rumelhart and Abrahamsen (1973) were unable to use the distances from a two-
dimensional solution to generate predictions in an analogies task where distances 
obtained from a three-dimensional solution provided a very good fit. 
Although the results using animal names are certainly not definitive, the 
results are at least interpretable in terms of plausible, denotative, semantic di-
mensions. There are many examples to the contrary, and the number extant in the 
literature probably understates the number of failures considerably because of the 
difficulty in publishing negative results . Often these negative results are men-
tioned in a context with results that are more heartwarming to the author. For 
example, Shoben (1976) was unable to interpret a solution he obtained for fruits 
and vegetables. Pruzansky, Tversky, and Carroll (1982) report a number of 
scalings in which the first author was involved, and none of those solutions had 
readily interpretable dimensions. 
Semantic stimuli that are heterogeneous present a different problem. The 
resulting solution is often interpretable, but usually in terms of connotative 
dimensions. One example is a study by Arnold (1971) in which his hetero-
geneous group of concrete and abstract nouns yielded a three-dimensional solu-
tion that included the dimensions evaluation, potency , and activation (Osgood, 
Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1954). In large measure, such an outcome makes sense 
because it is highly unlikely that a heterogeneous group of objects will have 
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common denotative dimensions. The only common dimensions for such a collec-
tion are the connotative attributes. 
APPLICATIONS OF MDS TO COGNITIVE TASKS 
Although early applications of MDS often took the solution as the end result, 
some later applications have attempted to use the resulting solution to predict 
behavior. Rips et al. (1973), for example, used the distances between the exem-
plars of a category and the category name to predict latencies in a categorization 
task. In a reaction time (RT) task, subjects were asked to decide if, for example, 
a duck was a bird. Rips et al. (1973) found that the time to make this judgment 
could be predicted quite well by the distance between duck and bird in the 
multidimensional space produced by INDSCAL. 
Shoben (1976) extended this technique in a same-different task. He assumed 
that short distances should facilitate positive judgments and inhibit negative 
ones. Shoben used the derived distances to predict both same and different 
latencies in a task where subjects were presented with pairs of exemplars and 
decided if the exemplars were from same or different categories. Thus, the 
correct answer is same for goose-chicken and different for goose-bear. For same 
responses, Shoben (1976) found that the distance between each exemplar and the 
category name contributed significantly to the prediction of Same RT. In-
terestingly, and in contrast to processing accounts espoused by Schaeffer and 
Wallace (\ 970) , the distance between the two exemplars had no effect on laten-
cy . In a similar way, the distance between the exemplar and the category name 
also predicted Different RT. Not surprisingly, the distance between the first 
exemplar and its true category contributed significantly to RT. Somewhat less 
obviously, the distance between the second exemplar and the first category also 
contributed significantly to RT. Once again , the distance between the two exem-
plars had no effect. Let us consider the pairs bear-goose and bear-robin. For 
both pairs , bear is quite close to its superordinate mammal so this aspect of the 
decision should be quite easy . However, robin and goose vary in their proximity 
to the superordinate mammal. For a bird exemplar, goose is quite close , while 
robin is quite distant. Consequently, we expect bear-goose to be more difficult 
than bear-robin. 
MDS RESULTS AS A SOURCE OF PROCESSING 
EXPLANATIONS 
From the regression analyses described above , Shoben (1976) came up with a 
processing account of performance in the same-different task . He assumed that 
subjects processed the exemplars sequentially and he presented evidence that 
people did indeed follow his admonition to read the first word first. Subjects then 
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categorized the first exemplar and the difficulty in performing this operation was 
a function of the distance between this exemplar and its category name. Subse-
quently, subjects compared the second exemplar to the category determined in 
the preceding operation. Here, increasing distance made it more difficult to 
conclude that the second exemplar was a member of the category, but increasing 
distance made a negative decision easier. This model thus provides a satisfactory 
account of performance in a same-different task, and seriously questions the 
processing explanation offered previously by Schaeffer and Wallace (1970). 
Although Shoben (1976) used the MDS analysis to help devise an information 
processing account of a cognitive task, there are more formal accounts that are 
tied to scaling data more closely. In particular, the Rumelhart and Abrahamsen 
(1973) model of analogy is an excellent example. Although more sophisticated 
theories of analogical reasoning are now avai lable (Sternberg, 1977), Rumelhart 
and Abrahamsen's theory is one of the best examples of a formal theory derived 
in large part from MDS analysis . 
The task employed by Rumelhart and Abrahamsen (1973) was a 4-term analo-
gy problem. Subjects solved analogies such as fox:horse::chipmunk: __ . They 
selected the best alternative (in one experiment) from a list of four alternatives: in 
this example, antelope, donkey, elephant, and wolf, where elephant is the best 
answer in this case. In spatial terms, Rumelhart and Abrahamsen (1973) noted 
that the ideal point could be determined by constructing a parallelogram given 
the three vertices specified by the three given terms of the analogy. In other 
words, one must determine the relationship between the first two terms of the 
analogy and then apply those relationships to the third term to determine the ideal 
point. In this domain (animal names) , one must determine these relationships in 
all three dimensions. For the present example, fox is smaller than horse , some-
what more ferocious than horse, and slightly less human than horse. The ideal 
point is thus :"rger than a chipmunk , less ferocious than chipmunk , and slightly 
more hurr an than chipmunk. Elephant is the closest of the four alternatives to 
this ideal. It should also be noted that one can rank order the alternatives in terms 
of proximity to the ideal, as Rumelhart and Abrahamsen did, and one finds that 
antelope is the second-best completion, donkey is third, and wolf is last. 
In addition to predicting subjects' so lutions, Rumelhart and Abrahamsen 
(1 973) also level oped a theory to account for the distribution of responses. They 
assumed that subjects ' choices would be in proportion to their distances from the 
ideal point. More formally, they suggested that the distribution of responses 
would follow Luce's (1959) choice rule. 
x ) = v(dJ 
'n n 
2: v(d j ) 
j 
(1) 
Here, d i = X i - 1: the distance between alternative Xi and the ideal point , and 
v ( ) is a monotonically decreasing function and p(Xi lX l ' ... ,Xn) is the proba-
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bility of selecting the ith item from the n alternatives. Because Shepard (1972) 
had obtained good fits to recall data by using an exponential decay function, 
Rumelhart and Abrahamsen (1973) assumed that vex) = exp (- ax) where a is 
constrained to be positive. 
Using this one parameter, Rumelhart and Abrahamsen (1973) were able to 
obtain good fits to the data at both a quantitative and a qualitative level. Even the 
data for the third and fourth choices show a strikingly good fit. Moreover, this 
high level of correspondence was invariant when the distances among the alter-
natives was varied. 
The work of Rumelhart and Abrahamsen (1973) is an excellent example of 
how MDS analysis can lead to a formal processing model. The ability to deter-
mine the distances of the alternatives from the ideal was an important prerequi-
site to the application of Luce's choice rule. 
MDS AND CONSTRAINTS ON SEMANTIC MEMORY 
Although MDS analysis has certainly proven useful in a number of cases, to what 
degree are semantic memory models constrained by MDS results? Viewed most 
negatively, the answer is that MDS analysis has not provided much of a con-
straint on semantic memory theorizing. Some theorists (Collins & Loftus, 1975) 
argue that the appropriate metaphor for semantic memory is a network, while 
others have argued that a set-theoretic account is more appropriate (McCloskey 
& Glucksberg, 1979). From the perspective of the categorization literature, such 
fundamental questions as whether prototype models or exemplar models are 
more appropriate remains an open question (Smith & Medin, 1981) . From this 
account, it seems clear that MDS analysis (or any other kind of analysis) has 
provided relatively little constraint on theorizing in semantic memory. 
However, viewed most positively , MDS has provided considerable con-
straint. From the work just reviewed, it is clear that there is structure in semantic 
memory that any model must account for, and that that structure is based on 
meaning. If, for example, we are interested in the processing of analogies, then , 
on the basis of Rumelhart and Abrahamsen's (1973) work, we must take into 
account the similarity in meaning as indicated by the three dimensions derived 
from Henley's (1969) original scaling of animal names . Although it is correct 
that this analysis does not specify what form the "correct" model of semantic 
memory should take, it does specify an important constraint of which any viable 
model must take notice. This evidence for dimensional processing, for example, 
is more readily incorporated into set-theoretic accounts than it is into network 
accounts. 
Thus, judging from the semantic memory literature , it is important that the 
amount of constraint provided by MDS analysis not be oversold . The power to 
distinguish among broad classes of models is not in the power of the method. In 
fact, it appears to provide very little in the way of processing constraint. It does, 
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however, provide some index of structure for which any reasonable model must 
account. 
MUSIC PERCEPTION 
The area of music perception is a rapidly growing and exciting field within 
cognitive psychology. Most of the advance has been within the past 6 years and it 
has been largely concerned with the psychological structure of music. Given this 
structural emphasis, it is not surprising that the contribution of MDS analysis has 
been large. 
Early work in music perception was largely sensory and focused principally 
on pitch height (Stevens & Volkmann, 1940). Subsequent work (Shepard , 1964) 
has indicated a more complicated structure that is characterized by its emphasis 
on the octave. According to this account, the notes of a musical scale are 
properly thought of in terms of a chroma circle , analogous to the color circle 
discussed earlier. 
The more recent work on music perception differs from the earlier studies by 
using an explicit musical context. From the subject's perspective, the more 
recent studies are examining the perception of music rather than the perception of 
tones. Some recent studies, for example, have asked subjects to judge the sim-
ilarity of two tones in the context of a diatonic scale or to judge the similarity of 
two passages in the context of a melody. The use of richer context has enabled 
experimenters to recover (using MDS analyses) much more complicated struc-
tures. 
Perhaps the seminal work of these studies has been performed by Krumhansl 
(1979). She presented subjects with a variety of musical contexts: a major chord 
triad, an ascending major scale, or a descending major scale. Subjects in each of 
these context conditions rated the similarity of a pair of tones in the context. 
Differences among these three contexts were slight. Looking first at the raw 
similarity measures, some very regular results emerge. First, for stimuli in the 
major triad, other tones in the triad were judged most similar. Diatonic tones 
were judged next similar, followed by nondiatonics. For the diatonic tones (those 
not in the major triad) , the same pattern was observed. For the nondiatonics , 
there was little effect of this categorical variable; whether a particular tone was 
diatonic or nondiatonic mattered little. Pitch height was the primary determinant 
of similarity between a nondiatonic tone and another tone. 
The MDS representation that Krumhansl (1979) obtained is a complicated 
variant of the chroma circle. In her three-dimensional solution one can see the 
richness captured by the MDS analysis. The structure resembles an inverted 
cone. The components of the major triad form the base of the cone. For the C 
major scale she employed, these components are C, E, G, and high C, reading 
clockwise around the circle. At the next level are the diatonic tones. Reading 
clockwise around the circle at this level, we find D, F, A, and B. Finally, at the 
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base of the inverted cone (the circle with the largest diameter) we find the 
nondiatonic tones. Like the tones at the other two levels, the tones are arranged 
in ascending order if one reads them in a clockwise order. 
Thus it appears that more than a chroma circle emerges when tones are 
presented in a musical context. Even subjects who had little or no musical 
training classified tones in the fashion suggested by music theory. Here we have 
a case where it is difficult to think of a method other than MDS that might have 
been able to recover this structure. 
Krumhansl and her colleagues (Krumhansl, Bharucha, & Kessler, 1982) have 
generalized this result from tones to chords . In the context of a C major scale, for 
example, Krumhansl et al. (1982) demonstrated that the major chords (CEG, 
FAC, and GBD) were central in an MDS representation. For a minor key 
(Krumhansl et al. used A minor), the corresponding chords were A minor 0 
minor, and E major, respectively. Chords that were not a part of the scale 
sequence were at the periphery of the space. 
More recently, Pollard-Gott (1983) has used MDS analysis to examine the 
perception of passages of classical music. She had subjects listen repeatedly to a 
Liszt sonata. Pollard-Gott encouraged her subjects to listen carefully and to take 
notes . At the end of each session, she gave 28 pairs of stimuli that were con-
structed from the eight passages from the sonata that she selected. The passages 
varied in length from 4 to 16 measures. 
The similarities were analyzed using SINDSCAL (Carroll & Chang, 1970; 
Pruzansky, 1975). The data are particularly interesting when examined across 
sessions. The dimensions extracted, for example, progress from relatively naive 
and unsophisticated distinctions in the first sessions to a fairly sophisticated one 
in the final session . More specifically, the dimensions recovered from the sim-
ilarities obtained after the first session reflected fairly gross physical features of 
the passages: happy-sad, high-low, simple-complex, and loud-soft. After the 
second session, however, the more sophisticated dimension of theme emerges . 
Here, this dimension separates, without any overlap, passages that deal with 
theme A from those that deal with theme B. This separation is even greater after 
the third listening session, suggesting that this more sophisticated dimension 
becomes increasingly important as subjects become more knowledgeable about 
the composition. 
Strong support for this interpretation is provided by the results obtained in an 
expert condition. Pollard-Gott (1983) obtained the same ratings from a group of 
subjects who had received extensive musical training. For these subjects, she 
obtained a SINDSCAL solution that accounted for 84% of the variance in one 
dimension. This thematic dimension again clustered those passages that dealt 
with iheme A at one end of the dimension and those that dealt with theme B at 
the other end of the dimension. 
At even a higher level, Halpern (1984) has investigated memory organization 
for familiar songs. She posited that relations between songs could involve extra-
musical similarity or musical similarity. To assess the organization, she gave 
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subjects 60 songs and asked them to sort them into groups of songs that were 
similar either in terms of their musical similarity (such as tempo, rhythm, and the 
like) or in terms of their nonmusical similarity (described simply as on some 
basis other than how they sound) . 
Halpern analyzed her results using both KYST and ADDTREE. Her scaling 
solutions were difficult to interpret and yielded poor fits (though using a max-
imum dimensionality of three and stress formula two may have contributed to the 
poor fits she obtained). In any event, the ADDTREE solutions for nonmusical 
similarity were readily interpretable and accounted for a high proportion (.92) of 
variance. A number of distinctive clusters emerged . For example, all of the 
Christmas songs clustered together in the nonmusical solution and these songs 
were further distinguished into groups of solemn Christmas songs (such as The 
First Noel) and children's Christmas songs (such as Rudolf the Red-Nosed Rein-
deer). The musical solution produced neither as satisfactory a fit (.71 of the 
variance) nor as interpretable a solution . However, some interesting results oc-
curred. The two groups of Christmas songs were no longer classified together; 
solemn Christmas songs were grouped with patriotic ones (such as God Bless 
America) while children's Christmas songs were classified with other chi ldren's 
songs (such as Happy Birthday). However, many songs retained similar posi-
tions in the tree structure across the two instructions. Although one might argue 
that this result is an artifact of the experimental procedure in which each subject 
performed both sets of ratings, it seems more likely to us that songs that are 
related by topic may simply be inherently more similar musically than pairs of 
songs not so related. For example, Beatie songs are similar to each other on the 
basis that they were all recorded by the same artists, yet they are also similar 
musically . 
Halpern (1984) went on to demonstrate that the distance in the tree structure 
was able to predict performance quite well in two cognitive tasks . In one task, 
she presented subjects with a song title and the music of a song and asked them to 
verify that the presented title was correct for the song. When title and song 
mismatched, she found that the discrimination was more error prone when the 
two songs were near each other in the tree diagram. In a free recall task, she 
found that adjacent songs were more likely to be recalled together than songs that 
were far apart. Halpern's results are consistent with the idea that familiar songs 
are organized in memory by conceptual (nonmusical) characteristics. 
In many respects, music perception is ideally suited to MDS analysis. The 
research is currently at a stage where it is important to learn how the psychologi-
cal representation differs from a representation that merely mirrors physical 
characteristics. In contrast to the research on semantic memory , for example, we 
really do not have any theories of music perception . Instead, we are searching for 
constraints on such a theory and MDS analysis has provided us with a number of 
them. They range from the perception of tones in various contexts to the percep-
tion of passages in a piece of classical music to the organization of familiar 
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songs. We have now perhaps reached the point where cognitive psychologists are 
ready to develop a theory of how people make these judgments of similarity. 
MEASUREMENT OF CHANGE IN STRUCTURE 
Some of the most impressive applications of MDS analyses have been in demon-
strating a change in structure. This change can be the result of a change in 
conditions, context , or age. By the examination of a set of stimuli in various 
circumstances, it may also be possible to extract higher dimensionality from the 
materials in question . At a minimum , it provides good evidence fo r change. 
Perhaps the most obvious place to look for an application of MDS that 
demonstrates a change in structure is in the area of cognitive development. 
Several investigators in this area have attempted to show that younger children 
organize stimuli along perceptual dimensions while older children employ more 
abstract dimensions. One study that illustrates this point very nicely was per-
formed by Howard and Howard (1977). They selected 10 animal names from 
Henley' s (l969) original set and had their similarity judged by children of vary-
ing ages. The subjects were first-graders, third-graders, sixth-graders, and col-
lege students. Using Carroll and Chang's (1 970) INDSCAL, they obtained a 
three-dimensional solution in which the three dimensions were size, domesticity , 
and predativity . Although these last two are usually thought of as equivalent , 
Howard and Howard make a good case that these dimensions are distinguishable. 
For the predativity dimension , lion and bear are at one extreme and mouse, 
rabbit, and deer are at the other. For the domesticity dimension , all fi ve objects 
are on one side of the dimension , with horse, cow , sheep, pig, and dog at the 
other. 
Howard and Howard (1 977) looked for a change in structure by examining the 
weight assigned to each dimension in the subject space. When they averaged 
over subjects in each age group , they found that younger children emphasized the 
perceptual dimension : size. Older children in contrast , emphas ized the more 
abstract dimensions of domesticity and predativity. Sixth-graders, for example, 
placed equal weight on the size and predativity dimensions and less weight on the 
domesticity dimension . Younger children placed greater weight on the size di-
mensions, while college students placed less weight on the size dimension . Thus, 
it does seem that increasing age leads to increas ing reliance on more abstract 
dimensions, at least with these stimuli. 
Mi ller and Gelman (1 983) have recently demonstrated a similar point with a 
more complicated analysis. They investigated the concept of number in children 
using techniques developed by Arabie, Kosslyn, an9 Nelson ( 1975). Miller and 
Gelman (1983) obtained similarity judgments for the digits 0 to 9 from groups of 
kindergartners, third-graders, sixth-graders, and graduate students. They used a 
modification of the method of tri ads in which subjects determined which of two 
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digits was more similar to a third . In order to reduce drastically the number of 
judgments required of very young children, Miller and Gelman used a balanced 
incomplete sampling procedure developed by Arabie et al. (1975). 
Miller and Gelman (1983) obtained two-dimensional sol utions for each of the 
four groups. For the younger children , the solution resembled a semicircle in 
which the digits were ordered by magnitude . For sixth-graders and adults, there 
is clearly an odd-even dimension in addition to one based on magnitude. For 
adults, moreover, a paradoxical finding is that the powers of two (2, 4, and 8) are 
closer together than they should be in terms of magnitude; the digits 2 and 8 are 
actually closer than the digits 2 and 7, for example. 
Although the results of the MDS analysis were certainly enlightening, Miller 
and Gelman's most interesting results were observed in their clustering analysis. 
Using INDCLUS, they obtained seven clusters. Five of them pertained to count-
ing, and the other two were the odd numbers excluding I (3, 5, 7, 9) and the 
powers of two (2, 4, 8). For the children in the two youngest groups, the five 
counting clusters were all assigned higher weights than these last two clusters. 
For the adults, however , the powers of two was the cluster with the highest 
weight, and the odd numbers excluding one was the fourth highest. Sixth-graders 
were between these two extremes. 
The results of the INDCLUS analysis nicely complement the results from the 
MDS analyses in that both show increasing complexity as a function of age. 
There is a clear developmental trend away from counting as the sole dimension in 
digits and toward dimensions that reflect more complex relationships among the 
digits (such as the powers of two) . Methodologically, it is interesting to note that 
the clustering analysis performed by Miller and Gelman (1983) parallels the 
scaling analysis done by Howard and Howard (1977). Both sets of authors used a 
single result , a set of seven clusters for Miller and Gelman, and a three-dimen-
sional solution for Howard and Howard, and then examined the change in 
weights as a function of age . Both observed that more complex dimensions or 
clusters tended to be weighted more heavily by older children and adults accom-
panied by a corresponding decrease in the weighting for more primitive dimen-
sions or clusters. We might also note that the Miller and Gelman (1 983) paper is 
particularly convincing in this respect because these authors also obtained MDS 
representations for each group of subjects and the analyses of these solutions 
were highly consistent with this interpretation . 
One other unusual application to assess a change in structure has been per-
formed by Schoenfeld and Herrmann (1982) . They investigated the perception of 
the similarity of difficult word problems in mathematics. Earlier studies (e.g., 
Chi , Feltovich, & Glaser, L981) had shown a strong, but indirect, relationship 
between expertise and problem perception , with novices tending to use surface 
features and experts using deep , structural features. This study examined 
whether a course in problem soLving would lead to changes in problem percep-
tion. Each problem was characterized by both a deep structure representation 
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(refening to the principles necessary for solution , such as uniqueness arguments 
to be proved by contradiction, DeMorgan's Law, or linear dophantine equation) 
and a surface structure (referring to the salient mathematical objects involved or 
the subject area, such as polynomials, subset sums, or limits). Schoenfeld and 
Herrmann asked groups of subjects to sort the problems and then looked at the 
strongly clustered problems to see whether these problems were more alike in 
surface structure or in deep structure. Using Johnson's (1967) HICLUS program, 
they defined strongly clustered pairs as those whose proximity value exceed-
ed .5. The subjects were freshman and sophomores who had completed 1 to 3 
semesters of college mathematics. One group subsequently enro lled in a problem 
solving course and the other group instead enrolled in a computer programming 
course. The sortings of the two groups did not differ initially. Subsequent to 
these courses, the same problems were sorted again . 
The results were quite striking . Prior to course enrollment , most of the strong-
ly associated clusters (67%) were accounted for by surface similarity. Approx-
imately II % of the clusters matched the deep structure characterization and 
approximately 22% matched neither. For the group that took the computer pro-
gramming course, the percentage changed very little; 64% of the clusters were 
sti ll simi lar on the basis of the surface structure (with a deep structure percentage 
of 9) . For the group that took the problem solving course, however, the results 
changed markedly. Now , 55% of the clusters matched the deep structure charac-
terization, while only 9% matched the surface structure characterization . As a 
further control , Schoenfe ld and Herrmann had these problems sorted by a group 
of mathematics professors. For these experts, 67% of their strongly c lustered 
pairs were similar in terms of deep structure and 25% were similar in terms of 
surface structure. 
Thus, it seems that taking a course and increasing one's knowledge about a 
particular domain can have fairly radical effects on one's perception of problems 
in that domain. It would have been interesting if Schoenfeld and Herrmann had 
applied MDS techniques to their data and used an analysis similar to the one 
performed by Miller and Gelman. Even so, they have succeeded in showing a 
large change in structure in a complex domain . 
CONTEXTUAL EFFECTS 
One of the most important uses of MDS analys is in cognitive psychology is also 
one of the most underutilized. MDS analysis provides an excellent means to 
assess the effects of context. Examining stimuli in a number of contexts may 
have the coroll ary benefit of extracting more dimensions . 
One straightforward application of this strategy was performed by LaPorte 
and Voss ( 1979) in which they presented subjects with a set of nouns taken from 
one or two simple stories. Initially, subjects rated the similarity of all possible 
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pairs of nouns. For one story, the nouns were: fields. clouds. vegetation. train. 
approach. decade. troops. plague. eggs. and food . MDS analysis of this initial 
simi larity matrix yielded a two-dimensional solution in which the first dimension 
separated man-made objects from natural ones , and the second dimension was 
interpreted by the authors as separating animals from nonanimals with eggs and 
food at one extreme and clouds and fields at the other. 
Subsequent to this initial rating task , subjects read a story that described how 
grasshoppers become a pest every 10 years . These subjects then performed the 
same rating task as before. The first dimension recovered by the MDS analysis 
was the same as before and reflected the distinction between natural and man-
made objects. The second dimension , however , was radically different and re-
flected the temporal ordering of the objects as they occurred in the story. 
Bisanz, LaPorte, Vesonder, and Voss (1978) developed a more extensive 
framework for studying the effects of prose context. Like LaPorte and Voss 
(1979) , Bisanz et al. were able to demonstrate an effect of context by comparing 
representations. However, they were also able to recover the thematic structure 
of the prose context. Finally , and perhaps most importantly , Bisanz et al. were 
able to show that the recovered representation cou ld also predict memory 
performance. 
Bisanz et al. (1978) presented subjects with pairs of animal names either 
before or after reading a short story that contained each of these names. When 
subjects judged the simi larity of these animals before reading the story, the 
resulting MDS solution was very similar to the one obtained by Rips et al. 
(1973) ; the two dimensions could be characterized in terms of size and ferocity. 
Subjects then read a story in which all of the animals were portrayed in terms of 
their leadership and their helpfulness. Subsequently , they were asked to judge 
the similarity of the animals in terms of their relationship as expressed in the 
story. Both themes were recovered as dimensions in the MDS analysis, although , 
interestingly , these themes were not recovered equally well. 
Bisanz et al. (1978) also used this poststory MDS solution to predict perfor-
mance in a memory task . They presented subjects with pairs of animal names and 
asked subjects to decide if they were both helpful or both not helpful. At least for 
affirmative responses , it was clear that the distance between the two animals in 
the multidimensional space predicted the latencies fairly well . Pairs that were 
close to each other were responded to more rapidly than pairs that were far apart. 
Although Bisanz et al. found a relationship between distance and latency, it 
might have been possible to obtain greater predictability in their task . The only 
distance that they examined was the distance between the two stimuli in the pair. 
It is a reasonable hypothesis to suggest that the distance between each of the 
items and the point for helpful might influence decision time for affirmative 
responses. Further, these di stances might be even more important for negative 
responses. Let us assume that lion is helpful and tiger is not. If one also assumes 
that lion is processed first , then a straightforward processing model suggests that 
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the lion-helpful distance is related to the speed with which one can determine that 
a lion is a helpful animal. The question then becomes whether or not tigers are 
helpful. Here, the distance between tiger and helpful is the critical determinant. 
Because the correct answer is negative, we expect that short distances will make 
it more difficult to conclude that tigers are not helpful. Thus , small distances are 
inhibitory and large distances facilitative for negative decisions. 
Obviously, this analysis is purely speculat ive. However, it does explain why 
Bisanz et al. (1978) obtained better predictability with affirmative responses . 
Additionally, using a categorization task, Shoben (1976) found that the distance 
between the exemplars and the appropriate superordinate was always a better 
predictor than the distance between the two exemplars in a same-different task. It 
is our contention that similar research could profit from this kind of MDS 
analysis as it leads to a fairly direct comparison of several alternative processing 
accounts. 
CONTEXT AND INCREASED DIMENSIONALITY 
Using several contexts can increase the dimensionality of the solution recovered 
by MOS. Although increased dimensionality is quite properly not the principal 
goal in investigating the effects of context, the ability to recover additional 
dimensions is a byproduct that should not be ignored. Although there is not a 
hard and fas t rule that increas ing the number of contexts will increase the number 
of recoverable dimensions, it is at least suggestive that Howard and Howard 
(1977) were able to extract three dimensions from their INDSCAL solution 
(using four contexts) of 10 animal names whereas Rips et al. ( 1973) could extract 
only two dimensions from their INDSCAL solution even though they employed 
14 animal names. 
The most striking example of the higher dimensionality arising from increas-
ing the number of contexts is a study by Soli and Arabie (1979) of consonant 
phonemes. They used the classic Miller and Nicely ( 1955) data which Soli and 
Arabie (1979) transformed to conform better to the INDSCAL model (see Arabie 
& Soli, 1982, for the justification and details of thi s procedure). In contrast to 
earlier analyses of the Miller-Nicely data using scaling techniques, Soli and 
Arabie (1979) used the full set of confusion matrices, including those where the 
judgments were made under severe levels of distortion . 
Soli and Arabie (1979) obtained a four-dimensional solution that accounted 
for 69% of the variance. Their first dimension ordered the consonants in terms of 
periodicity/ burst with ml and nl at one end of the dimension and pi, tI, k/, fI, 
and sl at the other. The second dimension ordered the stimuli in terms of first 
formants and thus separated the vo iced consonants from the voiceless ones. The 
third dimension similarly ordered the consonants in terms of their second for-
mants. Finally , the fourth dimension ordered the stimuli in terms of spectral 
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dispersion, with two groups of fricatives separated from the other phonemes. 
This fourth dimension is largely relevant to a particular listening condition. 
Soli and Arabie (1979) showed that the salience of a particular dimension 
varied greatly with the listening condition. In general, increasing levels of degra-
dation increased the reliance on the periodicity/burst and first formant dimen-
sions and decreased the contribution of the second formant and spectral disper-
sion dimensions . Thus, Soli and Arabie were able to extract additional informa-
tion out of an old and very well-analyzed data set. By making the data conform 
more closely to the INDSCAL model, they were able to extract more justifiable 
dimensions from these data than any prior researchers had been able to do. More 
importantly, this higher dimensionality enabled them to make some arguments 
concerning the relative importance of acoustic as opposed to phonemic properties 
in the underlying representation. From these examples, it appears that MDS can 
be a very powerful tool in assessing contextual change. In many respects, it is 
unfortunate that researchers in cognitive psychology have not taken greater ad-
vantage of this opportunity. Particularly given the trend in the past decade away 
from the view that concepts have invariant meanings and toward the view that 
meanings are flexible, it would seem that these procedures could be put to good 
use. For example, one of us has been involved in research on context effects in 
semantic memory. Roth and Shoben (1983) argued that context determined the 
goodness-of-example of an exemplar for any category. They found that robin 
was a typical exemplar of the bird category in many contexts, but that it was a 
poor example in contexts such as "The bird walked across the farmyard" or 
"The hunter fired too quickly and the bird flew off." Roth and Shoben (1983) 
even discussed this change in goodness-of-example in terms of a spatial meta-
phor in which the stimulus space must be completely restructured and not simply 
refocused. The addition of the different spatial representations would certainly 
have added weight to Roth and Shoben's argument. If, for example, the solutions 
obtained for the bird exemplars from MDS analyses were quite different depend-
ing on whether the ratings were performed in the context of "The bird sat on a 
telephone wire" or "John removed the bird from the oven ," then one would 
have very good evidence for the restructuring hypothesis. 
Similarly, Cech and Shoben (1985) have argued that linear order judgments in 
which subjects must determine which of two objects is greater (or lesser) in 
magnitude are also subject to rather strong contextual effects. They investigated 
the way in which subjects determined which of two animals was larger or 
smaller. In a normal context in which the animals varied in size from flea to 
elephant, they observed the normal congruity effect (Banks, 1977). For small 
animals, it was easier to determine the smaller of the pair; for large animals, it 
was easier to determine the larger of the pair. Cech and Shoben (1985) found that 
it took less time for subjects to determine the smaller of rabbit-beaver than to 
determine the larger of rabbit-beaver. They also found that it was easier to 
determine the larger of sheep-crocodile than the smaller of sheep-crocodile. 
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However, when rabbit and beaver were the largest items in the study, Cech and 
Shoben observed that they behaved like large animals; in this context, it was 
easier to determine the larger of rabbit-beaver than the smaller of rabbit-beaver. 
A parallel result was obtained for large items. 
Although Cech and Shoben employed a number of other contexts to strength-
en their contention that memorial size was not invariant, it seems that MOS 
analysis might also have profitably been applied here as well. According to the 
claims of Cech and Shoben (1985), animals that are small should behave as large 
animals in certain contexts. If this claim is correct, then one should be ab le to 
compare the MOS solutions from the two different contexts and see a size 
dimension in both cases. However, if we are comparing only small animals in the 
restricted context condition , we should find at least some of these small animals 
on the large side of the neutral point of the dimension. The size dimension for the 
normal context condition should divide the animals into those that are generally 
thought of as large and small. Such a result would strengthen Cech and Shoben's 
more theoretical claim that people recode sizes in order to be able to use the full 
range of the magnitude scale. 
It thus appears that MOS can be very helpful in understanding the effects of 
context. It can tell us how dimensional weights change as a function of context or 
age (Bisanz et aI., 1978; Miller & Gelman, 1983) and it can also provide us with 
increased dimensionality in some cases (Howard & Howard, 1977; Soli & Ara-
bie, 1979) . We have also argued in the immediately preceding paragraphs that 
MOS analysis can be used to provide confirmation of many theoretical claims in 
cognitive psychology. 
MDS AND THE UNDERLYING REPRESENTATION 
In our discussion of applications of MOS, we have obviously used the term quite 
broadly. We have included not only two-way and three-way MOS, but also 
discrete, clustering algorithms such as MAPCLUS. It is a natural question to ask 
which of these models provides a best fit to data from cognitive experiments. 
Although the question may arise naturally, the answer does not. Even if the 
statistics concerning the goodness-of-fit are nominally identical, it is seldom the 
case that one can simply compare the numbers and determine which model fits 
better because the number of parameters is invariably different. In many re-
spects, the adv ice to be given is similar in spirit to Shepard's counsel on dimen-
sionality: use the one that fits the data the best. 
One approach to this problem is theoretically based . If one has a theory that is 
inherently spatial, then it makes sense to test the viability of the theory by 
ascertaining whether MOS analysis will provide a satisfactory account. Friendly 
(1977) has followed this procedure for recall data. A similar approach has been 
performed by Reitman and Reuter (1980) . Although their technique is only 
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peripherally related to MDS, they used their theoretical notions to identify 
chunks in free recall, which they then converted into a lattice and finally into an 
ordered tree. Hirtle (1982) has recently extended this line of work. 
Perhaps the most ambitious attempt to compare theories directly is the work 
by Pruzansky, Tversky, and Carroll (1982). They compared the fit of a simple 
additive tree, as exemplified by Sattath and Tversky's (1979) ADDTREE to 
MDS as exemplified by KYST. They first demonstrated that each of these 
algorithms provided a better fit to artificial data when the underlying representa-
tion was consistent with the assumptions of the program . Specifically, when the 
artificial data was generated from a tree, ADDTREE provided a better fit; when 
the artificial data were generated from a plane, KYST gave a better fit to the 
data . This relationship held up over many levels of noise in the data and over 
wide variations in number of stimuli. Thus it seems that there is no uniform 
advantage of one procedure over the other. 
Pruzansky et al. (1982) found two empirical measures that predicted which of 
the two models would provide a better fit to data (as measured either by product 
moment correlations or by stress formula 2). The first was skewness, defined in 
the standard way as the third central moment divided by the cubed standard 
deviation . The second measure was elongation. Pruzansky et al. defined elonga-
tion in terms of triples of nodes. From the nature of binary rooted trees, they 
observed that it is usually the case that for any triple of nodes , two will form a 
subcluster. For a triple that includes i, j, and k, assume that i and j form the 
subcluster. If we look at the triangle formed by connecting these three points, 
then it is expected that <Pij ::5 <Pjk ::5 <P ik . It would similarly be expected that the 
differences of the distances would have the relationship <Pik - <Pjk ::5 <Pjk - <Pi)' 
Phrased geometrically, the middle side is closer in length to the long side than it 
is to the short side. Pruzansky et al. defined elongation as the proportion of 
triangles in the data where this re lationship holds . 
Looking at real data , Pruzansky et al. (1982) computed these two measures 
for 20 data sets. In general, when the elongation measure was high and skewness 
was low , ADDTREE provided a better fit than did KYST. More explicitly when 
the elongation measure was .65 or higher and when the skewness was less than 
-.4, ADDTREE provided a better fit; otherwise KYST did. Interestingly , these 
two measures never conflicted for the data sets that Pruzansky et al. examined 
and the two measures tended to be negatively correlated. 
An important result of this analysis is that data sets whose stimuli could be 
described as perceptual (colors, forms , and letters) were better fit by KYST, but 
data sets whose stimuli could be described as conceptual (such as exemplars from 
semantic categories) were better fit by ADDTREE. Although Pruzansky et al. 
noted that factorial designs tended to favor KYST and that such designs tended to 
be employed when perceptual stimuli were investigated, these authors offered no 
other explanation of this result. 
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Although there is no doubt that Pruzansky et al.'s ( 1982) finding is sug-
gestive, we believe that there is reason for caution before concluding that con-
ceptual stimuli are invariably fit better by ADDTREE than by KYST. As we 
discuss in the next section, there are good reasons to suspect that MDS al-
gorithms have difficulty when category names and exemplars must be repre-
sented in the same space. Thus, one difficulty may lie in the particular stimulus 
sets employed by Pruzansky et al. (1982). Although most of them are un-
published, we have sufficient familiarity with eight of them to offer some spec-
ulation. The first seven data sets (referenced by Pruzansky et al as the Mervis et 
al data sets) consisted of 19 exemplars and one category name. The eighth data 
set (Henley, 1969) consisted of 30 exemplars and no category name. For the first 
seven data sets, the superiority of ADDTREE as determined by both of Pru-
zansky et al.'s (1982) measures of goodness of fit averaged .15 for r2L and .07 
for r2M . The superiority of ADDTREE for the eighth data set was about half 
these means, .08 and .03 respectively. Only one of the first seven data sets had 
smaller differences (in the goodness-of-fit measures) than did Henley's data set. 
PROBLEMS WITH CATEGORIES 
The difficulty that MDS has with categorical data sets may be a result of the way 
people judge simi larities in this context and not an indication of the nature of the 
underlying representation. We would like to suggest (following Shoben, 1983) 
that the peculiarities of the similarity judgments may create problems for scaling 
algorithms and that these problems may have led Pruzansky et al. (1982) to find 
poorer fits with KYST than with ADDTREE for these types of data sets. 
As others have found, Shoben (1976) noted that all members of a category 
tended to be rated as highly simi lar to their category name. For example, even an 
atypical bird such as goose was judged to be quite simi lar to bird. In fact , the 
simi larity of these two terms was about as great as the simi larity between two 
very similar exemplars , such as hawk and eagle. The problem for scaling al-
gorithms arises when one considers that both robin and goose are highly simi lar 
to bird, but robin and goose are quite dissimilar to each other. In an MDS 
solution, robin and goose should be quite distant from each other because of their 
direct simi larity rating. However, because of the proximity of each to bird, they 
should be quite close to each other. Put more generally , the distances between 
exemplars often conflict with the distances between each exemplar and the 
superordinate. This type of conflict is not present if superordinate terms are not 
among the test stimuli. Therefore, it is possible that the reason that Henley's 
(1969) data were fit relatively well by KYST in the study by Pruzansky et al. is 
that her data did not contain superordinate terms. 
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Some very recent work by Tversky and Hutchinson (1986) has formalized this 
generalization. They noted that the situation in which many exemplars are most 
similar to the superordinate is an example of the Voronoi problem (e.g ., New-
man, Rinott, & Tversky, 1983) in which only a small number of points in a space 
can be the nearest neighbor of a particular point. In terms of the spatial represen-
tation (using Euclidean distance) of categories, the superordinate can have only 
five exemplars (in a two-dimensional solution; 11 in a three-dimensional solu-
tion) for which it is the nearest neighbor. As their Table 3 indicates, this con-
straint is violated in many cases in which exemplars are scaled with their 
superordinates. 
One obvious solution to this problem is to omit the superordinate. If one is 
interested primarily in the relationships among exemplars, then this solution can 
provide a distinct improvement. As measured by Tversky and Hutchinson, re-
moving the superordinate greatly reduced the nearest neighbor problems in the 
data (as measured by their statistics of centrality and reciprocity) and subsequent 
scaling usually showed a decrease in stress when the superordinate term was 
removed. 
It is not clear how one can circumvent the problem of superordinate terms 
when the relationship between the exemplar and category name is important. In 
some sense the difficulty for algorithms such as KYST's is to fit the distance 
between exemplars and the distance between exemplars and the superordinate 
category name (typicality) at the same time. One possibility is to try to fit these 
two types of distances separately; another approach is simply to decide that one 
set of distances is less important than another. We discuss each of these issues in 
turn. 
Krumhansl (1983) attempted to measure the typicality of exemplars (in this 
case, musical tones) separately. She argued that the similarity of two terms is a 
function not only of the distance between two objects, but also of the distance 
between each object and the superordinate. In the absence of explicit context, the 
stimuli are structured in a chroma circle, as we noted earlier. However, when she 
varied the context (in terms of which scale was used) she showed that not only 
did the notes vary in their proximity to the superordinate (vertical structure); they 
also varied in terms of their relationship to each other (horizontal structure). 
Although this structure is certainly an elegant one, it is not clear how general 
it might be. For musical tones, it appears that context refocuses the horizontal 
structure; it does not require a radical restructuring. For semantic categories , if 
we are to take the conclusions of Roth and Shoben (1983) at face value, radical 
restructuring is at least a possibility , and thus this method developed by Krum-
hans I (1983) might not be applicable in such circumstances. 
An alternative approach is simply to decide that one set of distances is less 
important than another. For example, Shoben (1976) used MDS analysis to 
derive distances which he then used to predict RT in a categorization task. To 
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perform the necessary regressions, the distances he needed were the exemplar-
superordinate distances . In the initial MDS solution , an examination of the 
Shepard diagram indicated that the greatest disparity between the fitted distances 
and the original data occurred with superordinates. Because these distances were 
precisely the ones that Shoben wanted to use in subsequent analyses, he rescaled 
the original using the weights option in KYST. This little-known feature of 
KYST allows the user to specify weights for various similarities. In thi s particu-
lar case, Shoben (1976) weighted the exemplar-superordinate similarities very 
heavily in order to ensure that the disparity between the original data and the 
fitted di stances would be minimal for these pairs. For his task, the manipulation 
was highly successful in that these exemplar-superordinate distances predicted 
RT very well. 
SELECTING A REPRESENTATION 
There are no hard and fast rules for selecting a single underlying representation. 
Shepard (1980) , among others, has argued that the interpretability of the solution 
is one important criterion. Clearly, the plausibility of the underlying representa-
tion is not enhanced if the so lution is not interpretable. However, this criterion is 
far from objective. We have discussed several solutions based on Henley's 
(1969) animal data that are readily interpretable. Yet, Sattath and Tversky ( (979) 
have argued that their ADDTREE solution of these data is more interpretable 
than the ones obtained by MOS. 
Moreover, there are often theoretical reasons for preferring one solution to 
another. Krumhansl (1983), as noted earlier, had excellent theoretical reasons for 
analyzing her data on musical tones in a particular way . Because she wanted to 
examine the similarity of the tones to each other and the typicality of each tone 
with respect to a particular scale separately, her choice of the underlying repre-
sentation was severely limited. Moreover, there may also be other data that 
constrain what is the ideal representation. 
Thus, the criteria established by Pruzansky et aJ. (J 982) should not be taken 
too literally . Although their generalization that conceptual data are fit better by 
an additive tree whereas perceptual data are better represented by a plane is a 
provocative conclusion, one should not rule out an entire class of models because 
of this conclusion . Besides the additional criteria of interpretability and other 
constraints on the representation, there may be peculiarities of particular data sets 
(such as categories) that may have led to artificially poor fits. 
Finally , it should be pointed out that subtle changes in method may make a 
tremendous difference in the results. The best example of this phenomenon is the 
reanalysis of the Miller-Nicely data by Soli and Arabie (J 979). According to the 
Pruzansky et aJ. (1982) classification, both INDSCAL and MDSCAL assume 
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that the underlying representation is a plane, yet Soli and Arabie used the former 
method and were able to recover four , highly interpretable, dimensions while 
Shepard used the latter and recovered only two . It thus seems premature to 
specify any clear set of rules for determining the best underlying representation 
for any set of data. 
MINKOWSKI r METRICS 
Most applications of MDS and related procedures in cognitive psychology have 
assumed that the psychological distances recovered are Euclidean. However, 
there is good reason to suspect that there are many circumstances where some 
other, theoretically interesting , metric might provide a better fit to the data . 
Moreover, the selection of the Euclidean metric also has psychological implica-
tions for our conception of the stimuli . More specifically , it has been argued by 
Shepard (1964) and by Garner (1972) that if the stimuli are best represented in a 
Euclidean space, then the stimuli are wholi stic or integral, rather than analyzable 
or separable. Unfortunately, many have assumed that their stimuli were integral 
without a thorough exploration of other possibilities. 
In the most general sense, the equation for distance is given in Equation 2. We 
can restrict our attention to the Minkowski family of metrics when r 2: I. 
d - [~ I 11'] 1/1' ij - ~k Xik - xjk (2) 
In the case where r is 2, then we have the fami liar Euclidean case; the distance 
between two points is the square root of the sum of the squared differences along 
all the relevant dimensions. 
However, in addition to the Euclidean metric, there are at least two other 
metrics that are theoretically interesting. The first of these is the city-block 
metric, so named because distance is computed in the manner in which one 
measures distance in a city that is laid out in a grid pattern . For example, to go 
from 42nd Street and 10th A venue to 32nd street and 6th Avenue in New York is 
a distance of 14 blocks. One cannot travel along the hypotenuse of the triangle. 
In terms of dimensions, the distance between the two locations is the sum of their 
differences on the two dimensions: north-south distance and east-west distance. 
In terms of Equation 2, city-block metric is obtained when r = I. This metric is 
particularly interesting to psychologists because it (according to Garner [1 972] 
and Shepard [1964]) indicates that the stimuli are separable rather than integral. 
The other theoretically interesting metric is the dominance metric, when r 
approaches infinity. In this case, the distance between two objects reduces to the 
maximum distance between them on any dimension. Thus , for example, two 
objects that differ from each other by a moderate amount on each of three 
dimensions are closer to each other -than another pair of objects that differ only 
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slightly on two dimensions, but differ greatly on a third dimension . Although 
there have been few applications of this metric in psychology, Arnold (1971) 
found this metric fit his set of heterogeneous semantic terms better than did either 
the city-block or Euclidean metrics . Moreover, he argued that the dominance 
metric was psychologically more plausible than the Euclidean metric. 
Although these two non-Euclidean metrics are inherently interesting, there are 
understandable reasons why they have not received greater attention in applica-
tions of MDS in cognitive psychology. The first reason is that numerical prob-
lems are much more likely to be encountered with city-block or dominance 
metrics. When working with Euclidean distances, one can begin with a rational 
configuration or use some small number of random initial configurations and be 
reasonably confident that the solution is a minimum. Such a procedure will 
seldom produce optimal results for non-Euclidean metrics . It appears that local 
minimum problems are much more severe, and that vastly greater numbers of 
random initial configurations must be used (Arabie, 1973) when r is other than 2. 
Fortunately, Arnold (1971) has devised a method to circumvent most of these 
problems. As it can be both time consuming and expensive to run large numbers 
of random initial configurations, Arnold proposed a success ive approximation 
procedure that is neither time consuming nor expensive. One begins by obtaining 
the best solution when r = 2. Approaching city-block metric, one then uses the 
final configuration for r = 2 as the starting configuration for r = 1.5. Subse-
quently , the solution with this metric is used as the starting configuration for r = 
1.25, and so on. One approaches the dominance metric (with r usually set to 32) 
is a similar way; one uses the best solution in Euclidean space as the starting 
configuration for r = 2.5, and so on. 
When Arnold (1971) employed this procedure on his data, he obtained some 
striking findings. First, he found that stress declined monotonically as r moved 
from 2 to 1; it also decl ined monotonically as r moved from 2 to 32. Second , the 
solution with the lowest stress was the one employing the dominance metric . To 
our knowledge, this report is the only application of MDS methods to cognitive 
psychology that has found evidence for the psychological use of the dominance 
metric. 
As we noted earlier, the question of the appropriate metric is an exceedingly 
important one from the perspective of cognitive psychology. How the dimen-
sions are processed is nearly as important as what the dimens ions are. Models , 
for example, that assume that pairs of words in a same-different task are com-
pared on all dimensions do not seem telTibly plausible if the underlying metric is 
the dominance metric . Arnold's procedure is seldom cited, but it holds the 
potential to surmount a formidable obstac le. Cognitive psychologists would do 
well to become familiar with these methods . There is one important limitation to 
Arnold's procedure. For some unknown reason , it does not appear to work very 
well with two-dimensional solutions (Carroll & Arabie, 1980). 
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MDS AND MEMORY THEORIES 
In this chapter, we have discussed a number of different scaling techniques and 
provided some suggestions for their optimal use to study issues in cognitive 
psychology. In this section, we illustrate these techniques and suggestions by 
examining a particular problem. We considered using some well-known data set 
or gathering some new data on a very specific issue, but we felt that such a 
specialized topic might be of interest to only a limited group of readers. For 
broader appeal, we elected to collect and analyze data on a topic that is not 
usually studied by cognitive psychologists: What is the conceptual organization 
that cognitive psychologists have of prominent memory theories? Although we 
hope to learn something about the organization of the field, our main purpose is 
to allow an illustration of techniques in an interesting context. 
Some earlier research has been aimed at analyzing the organization that psy-
chologists have of their field. Coan (1968), by a combination of factor analysis 
and clustering techniques, examined how basic trends in psychology (e.g., ob-
jectivism) have changed historically and how they have been related over time. 
Fuchs and Kawash (1974; Kawash & Fuchs, 1974) used ratings and then factor 
analysis to describe six basic schools of psychology (e .g. , behaviorism) and 
summarize their differences. As part of a project examining the learning of the 
structure of cognitive psychology, Friendly (1981) scaled student and faculty 
views of the field. 
In the present case, two small groups of cognitive psychologists were asked to 
rate the pairwise similarities of 12 memory theories . (The two groups enabled us 
to analyze individual differences between groups as well as within groups, to 
illustrate another use of these scaling techniques.) These 12 theories were chosen 
from a larger list with the requirements that they be familiar to the subjects, that 
they not be intimately related to each other , and that they be partially concerned 
with memory for episodic information. The theories are listed in Table 7 . 1, with 
short descriptions and bracketed abbreviations to be used for brevity. Each 
subject received a random order of all 66 possible pairs of theories and rated 
them on a scale of I (very different) to 9 (very similar). One group consisted of 
four advanced graduate students at Stanford University and one visiting pro-
fessor. These ratings were obtained in 1981. The other group consisted of five 
faculty or visiting faculty at the University of Illinois in 1985. Four of these 
faculty members have their doctoral degrees from midwestern universities. 
There are two basic questions of interest. First, what is the underlying repre-
sentation of memory theories for these researchers? Second , do the two groups 
differ? 
Before presenting the results , let us go over the form of the data to be 
analyzed. For each of these ten subjects, we have a lower half matrix (without 
diagonals) for the pairwise similarities of these 12 theories . In addition , for each 
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group, we have the sum of the five individual matrices for that group , as well as 
the total matrix of all ten subjects. We analyzed our data first using MDS 
techniques and then using the more recent clustering techniques. 
MDS Analysis. The most satisfactory answers to the two basic questions we 
raised earlier are obtained by performing a SINDSCAL analysis, where the two 
groups are used instead of individual subjects. The two dimensional solution from 
this scaling is given in Fig. 7 . 1, accounting for. 728 of the variance. Although 
SINDSCAL does have the advantage of allowing the recovery of higher dimen-
sionality , our third dimension was difficult to interpret. Moreover, the increase in 
variance accounted for was small : the proportion increased .032 to .760. Our 
interpretation of Fig. 7.1 is that the X-ax is corresponds to the unit of material being 
analyzed, while the Y-axis corresponds to the degree of formalism or rigor. First, 
let us consider the abscissa. The two theories furthest to the left are the SCHEMA 
and MOPS models, followed closely by LNR, KINTSCH, then HAM. The first 
two theories deal with large units of analysis; groups of scenes, stories, or 
episodes. LNR and KINTSCH usually apply to slightly smaller units, such as 
small groups of sentences. HAM also is concerned with small groups of sentences, 
but much of the well-known work has involved one or a few sentences. The other 
seven theories usually deal with smaller units, such as sentence fragments or 
paired-associates. TULVNG and LEVELS often deal with slightly larger units 
than the other five, but the exact ordering expected by this interpretation for the 
other theories is unclear. 
Second, let us consider the ordinate. The two theories highest on this dimen-
sion , RATCLIFF and VECTOR have strong mathematical form ulations, as does 
the distant third theory, SAM. The next two theories, HAM and LNR, have 
strong computer formulations. The four theories around the origin, although not 
as strongly formalized, have strong and well -defined structure and processing 
assumptions. The three theories lowest on thi s dimension are espoused by psy-
chologists who have concentrated on developing general principles, rather than 
on developing formal models. Of these three, TUL VING has certainly been the 
most rigorous. 
Given this interpretation, we may next ask whether our two groups of subjects 
differed in their weightings of the dimensions. In fact the two groups weighted 
both dimensions very simi larly (.60 and .63, for the X-axis, and .58 and .55 for 
the Y-axis). Hence, from this analysis, there appears to be little difference 
between the two groups . Because the two groups were so similar , SINDSCAL 
was applied to the ten individual matrices. The object space is similar enough to 
Fig. 7. I that it would serve no purpose to present it , but the subject space is 
presented in Fig. 7.2 for pedagogical purposes . As one can see , two of the 
subjects appear to weight particular dimensions, but overall the dimensions 
appear to be used by all subjects. Moreover, it is clear that subjects' group 




TABLE 7. I 
Brief Description of Scaled Theories 
(Bracketed Names are Used in Figures and Text) 
1. James Anderson's (1973; Anderson et al., 1977) As§oci~tive Theories [VECTOR] 
Anderson's theory is a distributed memQry model with vectors representing patterns of individual 
neurons. Associations between items are modeled by a reweighting of the synaptic weights between all 
cells. The model has been ap?lied to various paradigms including item recognition and categorization. 
2. HAM - John Anderson & Bower (1973) [HAM] 
In HAM, information is encoded as propositions in an associative network. Querie s are answered by 
an activation search of the network. Most of the experimental work used sentence's or small group of 
sentences as stimuli. Computer simulations and mathematical modeling were used to derive the predic-
tions. 
3. Atkinson & Shiffrin (1968) [A&S] 
This theory distinguishes between structure features of memory and control processes. The structur-
al features include the sensory register, STM, and LTM and decay rules. The control processes regulate 
information flow between the stores. The rehearsal buffer model is a subpart of this theory. Experi-
mental manipulations included all of the main verbal learning techniques. 
4 . Levels of Proces sing - Craik & Lockhart (1972) [LEVELS] 
Levels of processing was proposed as an alternative framework to two - store theories. Our memory 
for an object or event is viewed as a byproduct of the various processing performed upon it . The 
formulation of the framework rests largely upon common intuitions about the depth of processing re-
quired by different tasks. 
5. Kintsch (1974) [KINTSCH] 
Kintsch's theory represents text as a list of atomic propositions. The organization of the test 
is captured by the overlap of propositional elements. His early experiments tested various reading 
time and memory predictions of his theory. Hi s later work (e .g., Kintsch & Van Dijk, 1978) presents 
a mathematical model for comprehension and memory of texts. 
6. ELINOR - Norman, Rumelhart, & LNR (1975) [LNR] 
Their model contains a network representation, but it emphasizes representations of procedures, 
called active structural networks. These structures have a case-like quality and use semantic primi-
tives in order to represent relations between ve rbs. Analyses have been applied to a wide variety of 




7. Paivio's (1971) Dual Code Theory [PAIVIO] 
Pai v io argued that verbal and figural information have separate memory structures, which are 
independent but partially interconnected. Typical tests employ paired-associate learning and various 
memory measures for single words and pictures. 
8. SAM - Raaijmakers & Shiffrin (1980, 1981) [SAM] 
SAM is a theory of probabilistic search of associative networks with varying strengths of 
connections. The retrieval processes are modeled mathematically and have been applied to free recall, 
paired- associate recall, and recognition paradigms. 
9. Ratcliff's (1978) Theory of Memory Retrieval [RATCLIFF] 
Ratcliff's t heor y of retrieval uses a resonance metaphor. Probe items evoke, in parallel, evidence 
from related items, wh ich is accumulated i n random walk comparison processes . The mathematical model 
incorporates several response measures and has been applied to item recognition paradigms. 
10. SCHEMA - Rumelhart & Ortony (1977) [SCHEMA] 
"Schemata are data structures for representing the generic concepts stored in memory. They exist 
for generalized concepts underlying objects, situations, events, sequences of events, actions, and 
sequences of actions," (p. 101) and are of primary importance in comprehension. Schemata have 
var iables, can be embedded, and can vary in their level of abstraction and represent knowledge. 
11. MOPS - Schank (1980) [MOPS] 
Schank has proposed MOPS as a flexible version of scripts. MOPS are "memory organizations packets" 
that are used in understanding and storing the experiences that we have. They provide an organization 
of the relevant episodes. In addition to theoretical discussion, MOP-like structures have been used 
in computer simulations of event understanding . 
12. Tulving (1972, 1975; Tulving & Thomson, 1973) [TULVING] 
Tulving has an identifiable orientation towards memory that runs throughout his many publications. 
Some salient aspects of his orientation are the encoding specificity principle and the semant ic-
episodic distinction. Tulving generally strives to present general principles rather than formal 
models. Most of the experimental work used lists of words or paired-associates and measures, recogni-
tion, recall, or cued recall. (Most of the subjects were not familiar with the Flexser and Tulving 
[1978] paper in which a more formal account of recognition failures of recallable words is given.) 


















FIG. 7.1. SINDSCAL solution in 
two dimensions using the two group 
matrices. 
Clustering. In addition to these scalings, a variety of MAPCLUS and IN-
DCLUS solutions were generated. We focus on the groups and overall totals. As 
with the question of ideal number of dimensions, the procedure for choosing the 
"correct" number of clusters is not well-specified, but an examination of a large 
number of solutions between 3 and 8 clusters convinced us that 5 was the best 
solution. The variance accounted for increased quite a bit from using just 4 
clusters , and did not increase much when we used 6 clusters. In addition, the 
interpretability of these solutions was good. When groups were used in the 
INDCLUS procedure, there was usually perfect agreement between the two 
groups on the order in which to weight the five clusters . However, different runs, 
with different random starts, seemed to provide quite different solutions. We 
found that the MAPCLUS solutions were more similar to each other. Because the 
groups showed only minor differences in their weights of the various clusters, we 
focus on the MAPCLUS solution. Table 7.2 contains a MAPCLUS solution that 
accounted for . 813 of the variance . In considering each of these clusters , we will 
also provide information about the other solutions (generated with different 
initial configurations) to help interpretability. The most weighted cluster in this 
solution (HAM, KINTSCH, LNR, SCHEMA, MOPS), often emerged as the 
most heavily weighted cluster in a large number of MAPCLUS and INDCLUS 
solutions, even when the solutions used different numbers of clusters. These five 
theories have a number of similar characteristics. As mentioned earlier, they use 












FIG. 7.2. Subject space from the 
two-dimensional SINDSCAL solu-
tion when all often individual sub-
jects are used. Number indicates 
whether fro first or second group . 
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TABLE 7.2 




( 3 ) .2308 
( 4 ) .2162 
( 5 ) .1743 
Cluster 
HAM KINTSCH LNR SCHEMA ~10PS 
VECTOR SAM RATCLIFF 
HAM A&S LNR SAM RATCLIFF TULVING 
LEVELS SCHEMA MOPS TULVING 
HAM A&S LEVELS KINTSCH PAIVIO SAM TULVING 
That is, they all view the memory trace as highly structured, with the structure 
related to the meaning of the trace (propositions, cases). The second cluster, 
VECTOR, SAM, and RATCLIFF, also appears in most solutions. These three 
theories have strong mathematical formulations. 
The third cluster in Fig. 7.3 varied with different solutions. While it usually 
contains HAM, A&S, SAM and RATCLIFF, three other theories (LNR , 
KINTSCH, and TULVING) are sometimes included and sometimes not. The 
interpretation of this cluster is difficult, because it depends on which of these 
theories is "really" in the cluster. In some ways, it appears to be excluding the 
extremes: of units (SCHEMA and MOPS), and of formality (VECTOR at one 
end, LEVELS and PAIVIO at the other). 
The fourth cluster (LEVELS, SCHEMA , MOPS, TULVING) appears in most 
solutions, though it is not usually weighted very heavily. While the interpretation 
is arguable, they all appear to be popular theories that have clear general ideas, 
but rather vague specifics. That is, they all serve as types of frameworks. 
The fifth cluster occurs in a large proportion of the solutions, though often it 
also contains LNR. It appears also to be including a middle portion of the 
theories, by excluding extremes of units (SCHEMA and MOPS) and formality 
(VECTOR and RATCLIFF) . 
Minkowski -metric. In the last section , we discussed the use of metrics other 
than the Euclidean metric (r= 2) and claimed that a consideration of different 
processing possibilities through an examination of different metrics is an impor-
tant and often neglected use of scaling. With the memory theories data, it is clear 
that these theories are richly represented in the minds of researchers , but it is not 
clear how even the major aspects' similarities and differences are used to arrive 
at a rating. To provide an example of Arnold's procedure , we fit the city-block 
(r= I) and dominance (r= infinity, approximated by 32) metrics by starting with 
the Euclidean configuration. As we mentioned earlier, this procedure works 
well, but appears to have trouble with two-dimensional solutions . However, our 
preferred solution was in two dimensions , so we have compared Arnold 's pro-
cedure with 24 random starts in both metrics . 
Let us first consider the dominance metric , in which the distance between two 
objects is the maximum distance on any dimension. As SINDSCAL (or its 
progenitor, INDSCAL) does not allow Minkowski metrics other than 2, we used 
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KYST for this analysis. We found a good KYST solution (simi lar to Fig. 7 . 1) and 
used it as a starting configuration for r=3, then used this solution as a starting 
configuration for r=4, then go ing to 8, 16, and 32. The stress (formula I) declined 
from 2 to 16 and then stayed level to 32. (The stress values were .100, .092 , .088 , 
.083, .081, and .08 1 for r's of 2, 3, 4, 8, 16, and 32, respectively). The 24 
random configurations used as starts for r= 32 did not fare nearly as well as the 
stress of .08 1 found through Arnold's procedure. The smallest was .091, but only 
4 were below. 100, and 17 were above .200. 
The dominance metric solution is given in Fig. 7.3. Although the purpose of 
this paper does not allow a lengthy discussion, a brief examination may be useful 
for understanding the insights gained through the use of other metrics. Overall, 
the solution is similar to the one in Fig. 7.1 (the SINDSCAL by groups with 
r=2). The Y-axis appears to be related to the formality of the theory. The X-axis 
is somewhat different from the earlier solution , but for reasons to be mentioned 
shortly , seems to be well interpreted as before as dealing with the unit of 
analysis. A second point to mention before discussing specifics, is that both axes 
are stretched relative to the earlier solution . The Y-axis in particular has a much 
greater range and appears to be the more important of the two dimensions. 
In examining Fig. 7.3, the most striking result is how VECTOR is clearly set 
apart. With the Euclidean solution, the fact that VECTOR was viewed as differ-
ent from all the other theories was taken care of by making it a little more 
extreme on both dimensions. With the dominance metric, we see that VECTOR 
is set apart on the formality dimension; in every pair involving VECTOR, this 
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FIG. 7.3. Dominance metric two-
dimensional solution lIsing KYST. 
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other dimension is inconsequential. (In fact, it is likely that its X-coordinate is 
due to its similarity to RATCLIFF, which in turn is most simi lar to SAM then 
HAM, so may have needed to be intermediate .) This major determination by the 
Y -axis is true to a somewhat lesser extent of RATCLIFF and LEVELS (and to an 
even lesser extent to PAIVIO , which is extreme on both dimensions). We believe 
the heavy use of the Y-axis by these theories is what accounts for some of the 
differences on the X-ax is with the earlier solution , as just mentioned for VEC-
TOR. As another example, in order to satisfy all the pairwise constraints , the 
Fig. 7. I solution has KINTSCH as less formal than SCHEMA or MOPS, when 
our feeling is that most of the subjects would view it as more formal. The 
solution of Fig. 7.3 does have KINTSCH as more formal than the other two 
theories, although it differs from these two theories more on level of unit than 
formality. We view this result as more satisfactory. 
The results for the city-block metric, in which the distance between the two 
points is the sum of the distances along the dimensions, is not quite so straight-
forward . Starting with a configuration from a Euclidean solution , we went to rs 
of 1.5, 1.25 and then 1.0 with corresponding stress values of . 100, .091, .085, 
and .093. Although the stress with 1'< 2 was slightly less than with 1'=2, this 
decrease was not monotonic. We tried this sequence several times and variations 
of it several more times and always found this non-monotonicity. A second 
problem occurred when considering the results from the 24 random starting 
configurations. Two of these solutions had stress of .071, although the solutions 
were uninterpretable to us. Of the other 22 solutions, none was below . 10 and 18 
were above .20. The solution for 1'= 1 with stress of .093 is very simi lar to the 
r=32 solution given in Fig. 7 .3. From a visual inspection, the only obvious 
difference is that TULVING is closer to A&S on both dimensions in the city-
block solution . 
Summary. As we stated when starting this section , although we hoped to 
provide some information about the organization of the theories, the principal 
goal was to illustrate the techniques. From a technical perspective , there are two 
often neglected procedures that we hope will be used more . First, an important 
use of these techniques may be to compare groups on their representations and 
weightings. While our groups showed few differences , we hope the reasoning 
and procedures were clear. Second, we suggested that the use of other metrics 
should be considered and we tried to show the additional information that they 
can provide. In terms of how cognitive psychologists (or a small group of them) 
view memory theories, two further points may be made. One , degree of for-
mality and level of analysis unit appear to be important dimensions. Two , these 
features are correlated in that theories with high forma lity often involve mathe-
matical treatments and small units , theories with intermediate formality often 
involve symbol-processing and large units , while theories of low formality are 
often concerned with characterizing general principles and use intermediate-
sized units . 
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THE PROMISE AND LIMITATIONS OF MDS FOR 
COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 
In its most straightforward applications, MDS analysis provides us with some 
ideas about the underlying structure of a domain. Most of the applications that 
are widely known are fairly simple domains, from a cognitive perspective, such 
as the Miller-Nicely data on consonant phonemes, or the color circle, or the more 
recent work on musical tones. However, we have also seen a tendency to deal 
with more complex phenomena such as semantic categories, prose passages , and 
musical passages as well. This extension to more complex domains suggests that 
we have not yet reached the limit where MDS and related procedures become 
useless . However, it does appear that MDS is able to recover dimensions only 
when the stimuli have something in common. Although such a point may seem 
obvious, it is worth mentioning explicitly that the scaling of heterogeneous 
stimuli is probably not going to be terribly informative. For example, Arnold 
(1971) scaled a set of unrelated words and recovered the dimensions of the 
semantic differential: evaluation, potency , and activation. We suspect that the 
reason these connotative aspects of meaning emerged as the dimensions is that 
there were no denotative dimensions on which one could order the widely vary-
ing terms that Arnold investigated . 
Although MDS and related procedure can clearly make an important contribu-
tion to our understanding of a structure of a domain, it is less clear what these 
procedures can offer in terms of an understanding of the process . Strictly speak-
ing, MDS tells us nothing about the way in which the stimuli of a domain are 
processed. In terms of semantic categories, for example, these procedures pro-
vide no guidance on whether the concepts in a space are related because of 
connecting pathways in a semantic network or because of overlapping features. 
Thus, the kind of fundamental problem that is facing cognitive psychology and 
that we discussed at the outset of this chapter, is unlikely to be solved by a wider 
application of MDS. It is not clear to us, for example, how MDS could solve the 
debate over semantic memory models or the propositional-imagery debate 
generally. 
Although the applicability of MDS to processing questions is far less than its 
applicability to structural questions , MDS can help, usually indirectly , with 
processing issues. Perhaps the best example of such assistance is the processing 
model developed by Rumelhart and Abrahamsen (1973) . By invoking some 
additional assumptions (most notably Luce's choice axiom and an exponential 
transformation) they were able to come up with a sophisticated processing ac-
count of analogical reasoning in a particular domain. Less dramatically , Shoben 
(1976) developed a processing account of the same-different task (as applied to 
categorization) that was derived from his multidimensional scaling of the stim-
ulus items . 
Perhaps the most general way in which to view MDS procedures in the 
context of cognitive psychology is in terms of constraint. In our introductory 
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remarks, we mentioned the difficulty in distinguishing between dual-store and 
unitary accounts of the semantic/episodic dispute. The data, at present, seem not 
terribly constraining in that results that are interpreted as support for one position 
are quite readily reinterpreted as supporting the opposite view. In some respects, 
this outcome is a natural course of the progression of science. Its logical conclu-
sion, however, is that we need as much constraint on the domain we are studying 
as we can possibly get. MDS and related procedures are clearly capable of 
providing constraint and they are therefore of considerable use to cognitive 
psychology . 
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